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Lacking sufficient funds to build and maintain a sizeable navy, the young United 
States was forced to employ privateers as a “stop-gap navy” in its struggles against 
stronger sea powers during the War for Independence, the Quasi War, and the War of 
1812.  Many American leaders opposed privateering on moral grounds, but felt 
compelled to employ it.  Merchants and seamen were generally more supportive, wither 
because their usual employment, fishing and peaceful commerce, was denied them when 
enemies hovered outside American ports and began seizing American ships, or because 
privateering offered the prospect of quick and large profits. Sailors preferred service in 
iii
privateers to enlisting in the navy because discipline tended to be less rigorous in 
privateers than in warships, privateers appeared safer since their captains generally tried 
to avoid combat with enemy men of war, and privateers offered the prospect of more 
prize money from the sale of captured ships.  Officers in the Continental and United 
States Navy usually opposed privateering because privateers competed with them for 
recruits and for naval stores to fit their ships out for sea.  Though controversial, it cannot 
be denied that privateering proved effective. The attacks launched by the private vessels
on British and French commerce forced those governments to assign naval forces to 
protect their shipping.  At home, privateering brought a level of prosperity to several 
American seaports that those communities had not experienced before.  Despite its
development of a regular navy during the nation’s first half century of independence, the 
United States continued to employ privateering as an integral part of its defense policy, 
attitudes toward the practice remained the same, merchants eagerly invested in 
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  Oceanic trade played a significant role in the economy of the young United 
States. America’s farmers and planters harvested wheat, tobacco, rice, and other 
agricultural products, its forests yielded lumber and barrel staves, and its fishermen 
caught and processed cod, haddock, and other fish for sale to markets around the
Atlantic Ocean, West Indies, and Mediterranean Sea.  Americans also imported raw 
materials such as sugar from the Caribbean and manufactured goods from Europe.  
Duties on this trade were a mainstay of government revenues.  During the first half 
century of the new nation’s independence, much of Europe was at war in conflicts 
that engulfed the entire Atlantic World, thereby endangering the maritime trade 
which Americans depended upon.  During that era, the young republic could not 
afford to build and maintain a navy large enough to protect its interests at sea. Thus, 
Americans were forced to rely on privateering to retaliate against the merchant 
shipping of nations who preyed upon our commerce or blockaded our coasts.  It was 
a controversial policy as many Americans viewed privateering to be little more than 
legalized piracy.  Other Americans supported the practice as a means to harness 
                                                
1 This thesis follows the style and format of the Chicago Manual of Style.
2private enterprise to public service, as a way to provide employment for American 
ships and seamen that laid idle when enemy naval forces and privateers blocked their 
peacetime employment in fishing or commerce, or to inflict economic hardship on 
the enemy similar to that the enemy inflicted upon the people of the United States.  A 
person or group’s view of privateering often reflected how they were affected by it.  
The intensity of feelings varied, and many individuals had mixed feelings toward 
privateering.  Benjamin Franklin, for example, was philosophically opposed to 
privateering but employed it during the American Revolution in the hope that 
American privateers would capture British seamen who could be exchanged for
American sailors held captive in British prisons.2  Irregardless of one’s attitude 
toward the practice, privateering was necessary in this time period.  In addition to not 
being able to afford a large navy, the United States government could itself profit
from privateering, as the government heavily taxed the ships and cargoes the 
privateers captured.  During the War for Independence, American privateers 
captured supplies en route to British forces in North America and diverted them to 
                                                
2 Clark, William B. Ben Franklin's Privateers (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1956), v.
3use by Patriot forces.  It can not be denied that privateering contributed significantly 
to America’s wars with Great Britain and France during the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.  Indeed, privateers inflicted more damage on British merchant 
shipping than did American naval forces. During the War for Independence, 
privateers captured ten times as many British ships as did warships of the 
Continental Navy3 and during the War of 1812, privateers captured 39 million 
dollars worth of goods, almost six times the 6.6 million dollars worth of good 
captured by ships of the U.S. Navy.
  Despite this contribution to the American war effort, privateering remained 
controversial.  While some observers believed that privateering was “an enterprise 
that could not but appeal to the American temperament . . . ,” others condemned it 
arguing that privateers rarely went to sea for patriotic reasons, but mainly for their 
own economic gain.4   Many of these people considered it immoral to profit from 
war. Other individuals ignored considerations of patriotism and morality, but 
                                                
3 Dull, Jonathan R.  “Was the Continental Navy a Mistake?” The American Neptune,
44: 3, 169.
4 Forester, C.S.  The Age of Fighting Sail: The story of the Naval War of 1812
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), 85, 92-93.
4questioned whether the resources consumed by privateering could be better used in 
other ways, e.g., would the cordage, sailcloth, cannon, and ship’s provisions 
consumed fitting out privateers be better devoted to building a larger navy, or, would 
it be better to assign the men involved in privateering to service in the army or navy, 
or to coastal defense?  These questions occupied Americans from the Revolution 
through the War of 1812, the attitudes expressed over that forty year period changed 
as the U.S. Navy grew in importance but still changed little, and a consensus never 
emerged concerning the legitimacy or utility of employing privateering as a part of 
national defense policy. 
  Most books on the foreign wars of the young United States, the War for 
Independence, the Quasi War with France, and the War of 1812, devote a chapter or 
two to privateers.5  The few books devoted to privateering have generally focused on 
specific voyages,6 or aspects of privateering, such as the vessels employed or the 
                                                
5 Fowler, William M.  Rebels Under Sail (New York: Scribners, 1976) and Michael 
A. Palmer Stoddert’s War: Naval Operations during the Quasi War with France, 
1798-1801 (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1987).
6 McManemin, John A.  Revolution on the High Seas: A History of Maritime 
Massachusetts during the Revolutionary War (Spring Lake, N.J.: Ho-Ho-Kus Pub. 
Co., 1988).
5financing of voyages, or on privateering in a particular region.7  However, none of 
these works assess in any systematic way the attitudes of contemporaries towards the 
practice of privateering, which is the focus of this study.
                                                
7 Garitee, Jerome R.  Republic’s Private Navy: The American Privateering Business 
as Practiced by Baltimore During the War of 1812 (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan 
Univ. Press, 1977).
6II. THE WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE
  During the mid-eighteenth century wars fought between England and her 
French and Spanish colonial rivals, significant numbers of Americans invested and 
engaged in privateering, even though many of their countrymen frowned on the 
practice.8  During those conflicts, Britain’s Royal Navy had generally dominated the 
Atlantic and protected American commerce, so privateering was less a defensive 
necessity than an avenue to profits.  When conflict arose between Britain and 
thirteen of her North American colonies in the mid-1770s, vessels of that same 
British navy began preying on American shipping, the Americans did not have a 
navy of their own, and thus they needed a way to retaliate against the British.  
Therefore, many Americans felt necessity outweighed opposition to privateering on 
moral grounds.  The opportunity to make money by investing in privateering 
ventures or going to sea in ships bearing letters of marque, i.e., privateering licenses, 
                                                
8 Carl Swanson, Predators and Prizes: American Privateering and Imperial
Warfare, 1739-1748. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1991; 
James C. Bradford, “Two Centuries of Warfare for Profit: French and American 
Privateering, 1680-1865,” in Pirates, ed. by David Cordingly.  London: Salamander 
Books, 1996, 164-87.
7added to their support for employing the system.  There was debate in Congress 
about whether or not to authorize privateering, and as early as November of 1775 
privateering was authorized, but only against enemy warships, transports, and supply 
ships.9  However, as hostilities and necessity grew, on 23 March 1776 Congress 
passed an act allowing attacks on enemy merchantmen, and it was not long until 
privateering became one of America’s leading industries during the War for 
Independence.10  Recipients of letters of marque were required to post bonds of 
between five and ten thousand dollars which they would lose if they violated the 
regulations governing the conduct of privateering.11  Even those not directly 
involved in the practice of privateering could benefit monetarily, as John Adams 
profited from taking legal cases involving privateering.  
                                                
9 Bradford, French and American Privateers, 170.
10 J. Franklin Jameson from Morgan, William James, American Privateering in 
America’s War for Independence, 1775-1783, The American Neptune, 62 vols., 36: 
84.
11 Booker, Marshall. “Privateering from the Bay, Including Admiralty Courts and 
Tory as well as Patriot Operations,” in Eller, Ernest M. Chesapeake Bay in the 
American Revolution, 1st ed. (Centreville, Md.: Tidewater Publishers, 1981), 266.
8  Many government officials advocated privateering in the War for Independence 
because of their concern for the welfare of the nation.  Both John Adams and 
Thomas Jefferson supported privateering because it provided employment for idle 
mariners and put pressure on Great Britain to end the war and recognize American 
independence.12 In July of 1775, Jefferson’s letter to George Gilmer indicates that 
he is intrigued by privateers,13 seeing them as a means to “clear the seas and bays” of 
British ships.  He further believed that the privateers could “visit the coasts of 
Europe” to disrupt trade.14  On 12 August 1776, Adams expressed a similar hope that 
privateering would reopen trading lanes.15 Following American independence 
Jefferson, in particular, preferred privateering to a large navy because it kept military 
expenses down and provided a venue for the citizen soldier, two guiding themes of 
                                                
12 John Adams Notes of Debates, 4/12/1776, Paul H. Smith, ed., Letters of Delegates 
to Congress, 10 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1976-1983), 3: 514.
13 Thomas Jefferson to George Gilmer, 7/5/1775, Paul H. Smith, ed., Letters of 
Delegates to Congress, 1: 585.
14 Thomas Jefferson to Francis Epps, 7/4/1775, Paul H. Smith, ed., Letters of 
Delegates to Congress, 1: 581.
15 John Adams to Abigail Adams, 8/12/1776, Paul H. Smith, ed., Letters of Delegates 
to Congress, 4: 659. 
9Democratic-Republican ideology.16  South Carolina delegate to the Congress Henry 
Laurens was one of the strongest supporters of privateering, writing in October of 
1777 that the practice could help America “gain ground as independent people,” 
saying that damage inflicted on British shipping could lead its government to accede 
to American demands for independence. 17  Benjamin Franklin was not as strong of a 
supporter of privateering as Adams and Jefferson because he morally opposed the 
practice18 but he ended up investing in privateering in order to gain an advantage on 
the British by using the success of the practice as a bargaining chip to recover 
captured Americans and as a means to gain importance in “the eyes of the 
commercial states.”19  Robert Morris, a leading merchant before the Revolution, 
shared Franklin’s views.  At the onset of hostilities, he too opposed privateering on 
moral grounds, but by 25 April 1777 changed his mind in response to the atrocities 
                                                
16 Symonds, Craig. Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the 
United States, 1785-1827 (Newark, Del.: University of Delaware Press, 1980), 13. 
17 Henry Laurens to John Lewis Gervais, 10/22/1777, Paul H. Smith, ed., Letters of 
Delegates to Congress, 8: 160.
18 Burns, Walter F.  Captain Otway Burns: Patriot, Privateer, and Legislator (New 
York, [n.p.], 1905), 166.
19 Benjamin Franklin to Samuel Cooper, 10/25/1776, Paul H. Smith, ed., Letters of 
Delegates to Congress, 5: 385.
10
of impressment and the other offenses the British were inflicting upon Americans, 
saying that his “scruples about Privateering are all done away.”20
  With the Royal Navy dominant at sea and the British blockade crippling 
American businesses, the success of privateers in getting goods in and out of 
American ports provided both economic benefits and a lift to American morale that 
helped to keep “the flame of patriotic resistance flickering.”21 During the War for 
Independence, ship owners and seaman supported and participated in privateering for 
economic reasons.  In 1776, Robert Morris wrote to Silas Deane informing the 
diplomat that those “who have engaged in Privateering are making large Fortunes in 
a most Rapid manner.”22  At first, it was mainly veteran sailors who manned 
privateers, but later in the war landsmen with no previous experience as seamen 
began participating in privateering in an attempt to make large amounts of money 
quickly.
                                                
20 Robert Morris to William Bingham, 4/25/1777, Paul H. Smith, ed., Letters of 
Delegates to Congress, 6: 651.
21 Morgan, William James, “American Privateering,” 86.
22 Robert Morris to Silas Deane, 9/12/1776, Paul H. Smith, ed., Letters of Delegates 
to Congress, 5: 147.
11
  Some segments of the American population not directly participating in 
privateering seemed pleased with their success, as captures by the privateers made 
available luxury goods and a degree of prosperity that had not been seen in America 
before.  However, there were other Americans who did not support privateering.  
While the privateers did provide goods and a high level of prosperity, their lavish 
spending of the wealth they accumulated led to inflation which “gnawed at civilian 
morale.”23 These same Americans viewed privateers as greedy war profiteers, 
critical of the privateers’ lifestyles at a time when George Washington’s troops 
starved.  In fact, as word of the financial success of privateers reached the ears of the 
suffering Continental soldiers, it, in the words of Nathaniel Greene, “distracted the 
troops” from their duties.24  Another portion of American society, idealists, also
opposed privateering.  As late as the spring of 1776, Americans who continued to 
hope for reconciliation with Great Britain wished to take only defensive action 
against the Mother Country and therefore rejected privateering as too antagonistic,
                                                
23 Miller, Nathan.  Sea of Glory: The Continental Navy Fights for Independence, 
1775-1783 (New York: D. McKay Co., 1974), 261.
24 Miller, Nathan.  Sea of Glory, 262.
12
fearing it would raise British animosity toward the Americans.25  To them, 
privateering threatened to create an irreparable break between Great Britain and the 
colonies.  On 12 September 1776, Robert Morris explained his original disdain for 
privateering by saying that the business did not “Square with my Principles for I 
have long had extensive Connections & Dealings with many Worthy Men in 
England. . . .”26  Officers in the Continental Navy were the most strident opponents
of privateering because the more than two thousand vessels engaged in the practice 
competed with them for recruits and naval stores.27 Many naval officers blamed the 
higher wages offered by privateers, the greater opportunities they offered for prize 
money, and the looser discipline aboard privateers for the high rate of desertion 
during the war—almost one in five Continental sailors deserted during the war.  The 
fact that the Continental Congress and state governments retained two-thirds of all 
proceeds from the sale of prized taken by public warships while owners of privateers 
                                                
25 Morgan, William James, “American Privateering,” 81.
26 Robert Morris to Silas Deane, 12 September 1776, Paul H. Smith, ed., Letters of 
Delegates to Congress, 5: 147.
27 Morison, Samuel Eliot. John Paul Jones: A Sailor’s Biography (New York: Time 
Inc., 1964), 109.
13
retained only one-half to two-thirds of the proceeds—contracts varied—meant that 
sailors in privateers shared a greater proportion of the value of their captures added 
to the attraction of serving in privateers instead of warships.
  Their opposition to the government’s policy of authorizing privateering did not 
stop several Continental Navy officers from turning to privateering when the service 
did not provide them with steady employment. The result was “an incredible mish 
mash of confused accounts and conflicts of interest in which the Continent often 
came out on the short end.”28  Simply put, the quality of navy personnel suffered 
because of privateering.  In fact, William Whipple, a member of the Officer 
Procurement Committee established by Congress to deal with the problem, thought 
that “if nothing is done by Congress… the United States Navy will be officered by 
Tinkers, Shoemakers and Horse Jockeys . . . .”29   Thus, while the “stop-gap navy” 
served the country as a whole well, success of the privateers clearly contributed to 
the lack of a commitment to the Continental Navy and to other problems during the 
Revolution. Indeed, during the Revolution American privateers captured 
                                                
28 Fowler, Rebels Under Sail, 281.
29 Morison, John Paul Jones, 109.
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approximately six hundred British merchant ships, far outperforming the Continental 
Navy.30  
Irregardless of its contribution to the war effort, privateering remained 
controversial. Both Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin had been ambivalent 
toward the practice during the war.  In 1783, with the war won, Franklin proposed 
banning privateering as a form of warfare on humanitarian grounds.31   During the 
following year, Jefferson, who had recently joined Franklin as a diplomat in Paris, 
joined him in calling privateering a form of “robbing” and expressed a concern for 
the national loss of labor that resulted when privateers were manned.32
                                                
30 Bradford, French and American Privateers, 175.
31 Dull, Jonathan R.  Was the Continental Navy a Mistake?, 169.
32 American Commissioners to De Thulemeier, 10 November 1784, Boyd, Julian P., 
et al., eds.  The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 32 vols. to date (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1950- ), 7: 492.
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III. THE QUASI WAR
  The end of the War for Independence brought with it an end to the need for
privateering, the discharge of the officers and men of the navy and the sale of the 
warships of the Continental Navy.33  For over a decade, the new nation was without a 
naval force until the outbreak of the Quasi War again necessitated the establishment 
of forces to defend American interests at sea.  Fought between 1798 and 1800, this
undeclared naval war with France led to the establishment of the United States Navy 
and to a resumption of privateering.34 The new conflict was the product of the war 
between Britain and France which began in 1793 and led almost immediately to the 
seizure by both sides of American ships caught trading with the other.  This 
coincided with a declaration of war on the Untied States by the North African city-
state of Algiers in 1794. Congress began debating how the United States should 
respond to these threats as the Algerians had little maritime trade, meaning that
privateering would not be an effective counter to their depredations.  However,
Britain’s merchant marine was the largest in the world.  Thus the utility of 
                                                
33 Bradford, French and American Privateers, 176.
34 Palmer, Stoddert’s War, 20. 
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privateering quickly became a topic of debate, with one congressman arguing that 
privateering would distress the enemy more than any other mode of defense, adding 
that the “great naval powers of Europe show themselves sensible of this, by 
proposing to the United States to abolish privateering.”35  The first steps were taken 
to establish a fleet with the authorization of construction of six frigates, but the act
providing for those vessels included a provision that all work would cease if peace 
were concluded with Algiers. Such a peace was signed within a year and, after again 
debating the wisdom of constructing a navy, Congress authorized completion of 
three of the warships, but ordered work stopped on the other three.  In 1796, the
United States and Great Britain signed the Jay Treaty, solving many of their disputes, 
but the French viewed the treaty as virtually an Anglo-American economic alliance 
against them and retaliated by stepping up their seizure of American merchant ships.
  Discussion of defense moved to the fore once again. After the ratification of the 
Constitution, a number of congressmen hoped to use the power of the new 
government to establish a navy capable of protecting American maritime interests 
                                                
35 Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, from Gales and              
Seatons’ Annals of Congress (New York: D. Appleton, 1861), 4: 69.
17
and winning respect for it abroad.  When political parties were formed, most of them 
became Federalists and were not satisfied with a small navy augmented by 
privateers.  They proposed construction of a large fleet capable of countering both 
foreign navies and enemy privateers.  Federalists tended to oppose privateering 
because they believed that depending on privateers might postpone any significant 
build up of the U.S. Navy.  When the crisis with France led to a series of defense 
measures, among them the creation of the Navy Department on 16 April 1798, the 
officers of the new U.S. Navy opposed privateering just as their counterparts in the 
Continental Navy opposed privateering during the War for Independence. However, 
Congress authorized privateering on 25 June 1798.  By 1 March of the following 
year, 365 privateers were commissioned.36  As the conflict with France progressed 
and work was completed on ships for the new navy, competition from privateers 
continued to make it difficult for their commanding officers to recruit enough sailors 
to man their ships.  
                                                
36 Allen, Gardner W.  Our Naval War with France (Hamdon, Conn.: Archon Books, 
1967), 59.
18
The officers joined Federalist congressmen in opposing privateering, not just 
because they competed for men and supplies, but also because they knew that 
privateersmen were not likely to engage French warships and that the French Navy 
would be left free to attack U.S. commerce. As the conflict progressed their
predictions came true. Few American privateers engaged their French counterparts, 
but American warships produced tangible results by capturing 49 French 
merchantmen, many of them privateers, and three French warships, a “rather 
impressive” record for the new navy.37  
Benjamin Stoddert, appointed by Adams as the first secretary of the navy, made 
protecting commerce one of his objectives while in office, and with the U.S. Navy 
experiencing success against the French, many Americans became enthusiastic about
the possibility of building a large navy. 38  The public became less receptive to 
arguments by Republican congressmen, most of them Antinavalist, opponents of a 
large navy who continued to argue that privateering could effectively protect 
American interests at sea and also serve to save the country money in the long run. 
                                                
37 Symonds, Navalists and Antinavalists, 71.
38 Symonds, Navalists and Antinavalists, 73.
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They argued that maintaining a large fleet during peacetime would prove very costly, 
while privateers would cost the government, and therefore the American taxpayers, 
nothing because they could return to supporting themselves by carrying trade goods.  
Additionally, Representative John Nicholas of Virginia argued that possession of a 
large naval force could prove dangerous, perhaps so dangerous that it would provoke 
a conflict with Great Britain if that nation felt challenged by it.  Nevertheless, 
national enthusiasm for a naval force was high, and in 1799 Congress passed a bill 
which appropriated over 1.2 million dollars for construction of battleships, 
dockyards, and timber lands.39  Despite the successes of and support for privateers, 
the success of the U.S. Navy—which captured eighty-five French ships, including 
two frigates and numerous privateers during the Quasi War—  gave the Navy greater 
importance in the eyes of most Americans.
                                                
39 Symonds, Navalists and Antinavalists, 79.
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IV. THE WAR OF 1812
  Peace with France in 1800 meant an end to privateering, but unlike after the 
War for Independence, the U.S. Navy was not disbanded after the Quasi War 
because of the threat of the Barbary Corsairs and the rise of prominence of the U.S. 
Navy. Even so, the U.S. government would not continue to commit large amounts of 
money to maintain and expand the navy.  In fact, Congress would only agree to a 
minute provision for the purchase of timber, in part because Republicans who 
controlled the government after 1801 made cutting both taxes and the national 
budget one of their highest priorities while others feared that the possession of naval 
forces would lead inevitably to war.40  Antinavalists feared that a “temporary 
national enthusiasm for the navy to gain authorization for a postwar battle 
fleet…would then serve as an instrument for continued involvement in European 
political struggles.”41  Thus, if the United States was again drawn into war, it would 
again be forced to depend at least in part on privateers to conduct operations at sea.42  
                                                
40 Hickey, Donald R.  The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Urbana: Univ. of 
Illinois Press, 1989), 8.
41 Symonds, Navalists and Antinavalists, 179.
42 Forester, The Age of Fighting Sail, 14.
21
  Great Britain and France had signed the Treaty of Amiens in 1802 ending their 
on-again-off-again war, but the peace lasted only two years and when war again 
broke out between the two, both began again to prey on American commerce.  
Thomas Jefferson, now president, told Congress that our coasts “have been infested 
and our harbours watched by private armed vessels…They have captured…not only 
the vessels of our friends coming to trade with us, but our own also.”43 While 
concerned with defending American commercial interests and the nation’s image 
abroad, he worried about both the cost and the danger to civil liberties posed by 
standing military forces.44  As a result, Jefferson advocated the use of privateers to 
clear out coasts of enemy ships and to put pressure on their government by attacking 
their commerce.  In addition, Jefferson, still opposed to building a large ocean-going 
navy, called for construction of a fleet of gunboats that could drive off the enemy 
privateers.  This did not work and less than a decade later the United States and 
Britain went to war, with issues of maritime rights prominent among the causes. 
                                                
43 President Jefferson to the House of Representatives and Senate, 3 December 1805, 
American State Papers: Foreign Relations (Boston: T.B. Wait and Sons, 1817), 
1:66. 
44 McDonald, Michelle Craig. “The Chance of the Moment: Coffee and the New 
West Indies Commodities Trade,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, 62: 471. 
22
With only a small navy, Americans turned again to privateering.  On 18 
December 1812, Richard Cutts, a member of the House of Representatives from 
Massachusetts, moved to authorize the building of ten ships of war.  Cutts had the 
support of most Federalist representatives, but was opposed by most of his fellow 
Republicans, and his motion was lost by a great majority.45  The Republicans in 
government did not want to expand the regular navy because they planned to rely on 
privateers, who were attractive because they posed no threat to republican 
institutions and were also cheap when compared to building and maintaining a large 
navy, themes also seen during the Quasi War.46  Depending on it also appealed to the 
idea of citizen soldiers striking back at the British.  Before privateering was 
authorized, the American people “could hardly do more than merely endure the 
insults… with resignation . . . .”47
  Once the federal government authorized privateering in June of 1812, there was 
much enthusiasm amongst Americans.48 Despite a series of U.S. naval victories 
                                                
45 Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, 4: 606.
46 Hickey, Donald.  The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, 8.
47 Forester, C.S. The Age of Fighting Sail, 160.
48 Crawford, The Naval War of 1812, 1: 167.
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against British warships that raised American naval prestige in both America and 
England,49 Republicans continued to prefer to rely on privateering, an enterprise that 
“could not but appeal to the American temperament.”50
The government staked a claim to a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the 
prizes brought into port from privateers.  When some congressmen argued that this 
would stop many from investing in privateers, Congress passed other acts to 
encourage the enterprise, e.g., on 31 December 1812, Congress considered 
legislation to fund pensions for those injured aboard private armed vessels.51  When 
some legislators opposed the bill arguing that privateersmen should not receive 
pensions since they had not in previous wars, Congressman Peter Little of Maryland 
countered by citing their bravery and ability to annoy enemy commerce as reasons 
for supporting the bill and it narrowly passed on 21 December 1812.52  Two months 
later, on 13 February 1813, privateers were offered further encouragement when
Congress authorized payment of twenty five dollars for enemy seamen brought into 
                                                
49 Symonds, Navalists and Antinavalists, 173.
50 Forester, C.S.  The Age of Fighting Sail, 85.
51 Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, 4: 606.
52 Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, 4: 704.
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port as captives.53   As Britain’s Royal Navy tightened its blockade of the American 
coast, further deterring privateering, Congress lowered the proportion of proceeds of 
sales of prizes that had to be paid to the government.54  The government was short of 
funds, lacked the money to enlarge the navy even if wanted to and thus took these 
measures to encourage privateering.   Rather than cost the government money, it was 
hoped that privateering would become a source of increased revenue because their 
prizes were taxed by the government.55  
Just as in the previous two conflicts, the U.S. Navy opposed privateering.  
Competition from privateering impeded their recruiting efforts and took away 
supplies and men.  On 30 January 1813, Captain John H. Dent wrote to Secretary of 
the Navy William Jones that it would be impossible to man the ships in port because 
the few men there were taken by privateers.56  SecNav Jones tried to remedy the 
situation in February of 1813 when he authorized three months advance pay to new 
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recruits who enlisted in the Navy.57  A year later Captain Charles Gordon wrote to 
SecNav Jones telling him that this was not enough and that the Navy frequently had 
to offer bounties of between five and twenty dollars per sailor to simply man their 
ships.58  Isaac Hull expressed discontent towards the government for the “great 
encouragement given to the Privateers. . . .”59  In 1814, Captain Joshua Barney, 
commander of gunboats on Chesapeake Bay, also wrote to SecNav Jones expressing 
contempt for privateers who lured Baltimore’s seamen away from the flotilla service 
with lucrative bounties.60  These problems persisted and SecNav Jones wrote to 
Commodore Isaac Chauncey on 30 November 1814 that “the preference given to the 
private armed service, from the hope of gain, I fear will much impede our recruiting 
service.”61  In addition to competing for men, the U.S. Navy had to compete with 
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privateers for supplies.62  Ship builders constructed large privateers instead of ships 
for the U.S. Navy if it was more profitable, as it often was.  
  After its stunning series of victories in frigate actions during 1812, the prestige 
of the U.S. Navy suffered in 1813 and 1814 as most of its sea-going warships were 
bottled up in harbor by the British blockade.  Thus, during those years the “only 
bright spot {in the American war against Britain at sea} was in the continuing 
depredations of American privateers on British shipping. . . .”63  When the war drew 
to an end, the Navy had won great laurels in the frigate actions of 1812, the defeat of 
the British on Lake Erie in 1813, and the victory on Lake Champlain that stopped the 
British invasion from Canada.  Against these victories stood the Navy’s failure to 
stop British depredations in the Chesapeake Bay region, including the embarrassing 
burning of Washington, D.C., and the invasion of Louisiana. Yet during the entire 
war only twenty-two naval ships had put to sea while 517 privateers set sail to attack 
British merchantmen.  These 517 privateers forced Great Britain to deploy extra 
ships used as convoys to protect their trade.64  Admiral Sir John Warren wrote to the 
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Secretary of the Admiralty John Crocker on 29 December 1812 that attacks on 
British trade by American privateers had become serious, that more Royal Navy 
ships had to be sent to North America to control them, and that if no reinforcements 
were sent, British trade must “inevitably suffer, if not be, utterly ruined and 
destroyed.”65  In total, privateers captured 39 million dollars worth of goods, almost 
six times the 6.6 million dollars worth of good captured by ships of the U.S. Navy.
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       CONCLUSIONS
  During the United States’ first half century of independence many of its citizens 
and leaders did not fully approve of privateering, but with a government incapable or 
not willing to construct a navy large enough to compete on an even basis with France 
and Great Britain, they had little choice but to employ it as an integral component of 
national defense policy.  
  Privateering was not without attractions. First of all, the system provided a way 
to harness private enterprise to public good.  Secondly, they did enjoy a measure of 
success.  Although privateers did not single-handedly win any of the wars of the era, 
they did contribute to generally positive outcomes for the United States.  
Circumstances changed during the era—the government that fought the American 
Revolution under the Articles of Confederation simply lacked the resources to 
construct a meaningful navy, the governments under the Constitution that fought the 
Quasi War with France and the War of 1812 with Great Britain had the power to 
construct a much larger navy, but its leaders did not wish to do so. The reasons for 
their decision varied, but the result was a continued reliance on privateering by the 
young republic.    
29
  The dramatic success of the few American frigates against Royal Navy frigates 
during the War of 1812 altered the outlook of government leaders.66  When the war 
ended, there was no slashing of the naval budget or cutback in the number of ships 
on active duty as there had been after the American Revolution and the Quasi War. 
Instead, on 29 April 1816, Congress appropriated 8 million dollars to construct nine 
ships-of-the-line and twelve frigates.  Three years later, the depression that began 
with the Panic of 1819 brought to an end much of the construction. Economy in 
government again became the rule.  Over the next few decades, peace prevailed in 
the Atlantic Ocean, and there were no serious challenges to Americans’ commercial 
use of those waters.  On the eve of the Crimean War the maritime nations of Europe 
united in the Declaration of Paris (1854) outlawing privateering.  That the United 
States refused, even when pressured by several nations, to sign the document, 
indicates that its leaders retained a belief that their successors might have cause to 
again resort to privateering during a time of national emergency.  Thus, while the 
American people had, at best, mixed feelings about privateering, and their 
government the ability to construct a regular navy, American leaders thought it wise 
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to retain the right to call private enterprise into government service in the form of 
privateering should the need arise. Not until the American Civil War, when the 
Confederate States of American turned to privateering, did the United States 
government ban forever privateering, the system which had served it well.67
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